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# CINCLANT HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF CUBAN CRISIS - 1963 (U)



THE ATLANTIC COMMAND  
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
NORFOLK 11, VIRGINIA

A CVA with an embarked Air Group should be maintained in, or south of the Jacksonville-Mayport areas on a continuing basis along with supporting ships. If budgetary limitations were removed, selected elements of the Striking and Covering Force should be maintained on a rotational basis in the Caribbean area. The permanent relocation of certain Marine units for the 312 Plan would decrease reaction time for Marine elements involved. The relocation involved prepositioning a Marine Air Group at Key West and the assignment of an additional 1/3 Marine Division/Wing Team to the Atlantic Command along with appropriate amphibious shipping.

It was further recommended that one VMA squadron be maintained at Roosevelt Roads along with one GV for aerial refueling. The Guantanamo garrison would be reinforced and dependents evacuated. Prepositioning of additional ground support personnel and aerial tankers would be required to increase readiness.

On 9 October CINCSRIKE informed JCS, CINCARSTRIKE and CINAFSTRIKE that the response to CINCLANT's message of 6 October on increased readiness insofar as it applied to STRICOM forces would be prepared by his Headquarters since the action addressees were not in a position to assess the overall impact on the command. CINCSRIKE requested additional information on which to base his reply including: estimated duration of prepositioning; time of initiation of prepositioning; period allowed for completion of prepositioning; degree of prepositioning of forces contemplated based on prescribed phasing of the 314 Plan; and any JCS guidance which would aid in compilation of reply. This message was passed to CINCLANT.

On 8 October JCS referred to CINCLANT a memorandum from the SECDEF concerning "the contingencies under which military action against Cuba may be necessary and toward which our military planning should be oriented." SECDEF listed the following categories as likely possibilities:

- a. Soviet action against Western rights in Berlin calling for a Western response including among other actions a blockade of Communist or other shipping enroute to Cuba.
- b. Evidence that the Castro regime has permitted the positioning of bloc offensive weapons on Cuban soil or in Cuban harbors.